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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Beginning with Freud's (1900/1967, p. 284, footnote) 
reference to Poetzl's (1917/1960) study of the role of un-
noticed stimuli in dream formation, many psychoanalysts have 
viewed subliminal perception as an important research 
method. For example, Klein (1959, 1967) used the method to 
investigate the differential effects of peripheral versus 
focal awareness of stimuli and ideas. Her€, inputting 
stimuli at subliminal levels was view€d as a means to 
manipulate peripheral trains of thought. Pine (1964) noted 
that in many studies, the effect of a subliminal stimulus 
was often indirectly or symbolically related to the stim-
ulus content. These transformations of subliminal stimuli 
were thought to result from primary process thinking (i.e., 
use of condensation, symbolization, and displacement). For 
these authors, subliminal perception was seen as a power-
ful tool for studying cognitive processes h~pothesized to 
occur at unconscious or preconscious levels. 
More recently, Lloyd Silverman and his associates 
at New York University have published over twenty-five 
studies (summarized in Silverman, 1976) usin9 a laboratory 
1 
2 
technique termed "subliminal psychodynamic activation." 
These studies typically present some wish- or conflict-
related stimulus at subliminal levels and compare its 
effect on behavior to that of some (relatively) neutral 
stimulus. Relationships between particular unconscious 
conflicts and psychopathologies hypothesized by psycho-
analysts have been investigated with this method. For 
example, Silverman and Silverman (1967) found that sub-
liminal presentation of stimuli containing ~ggressive 
content resulted in increases in measured thought disorder 
in a group of schizophrenics. Predicted results have also 
been obtained with groups of depressives (Rutstein & 
Goldberger, 1973), stutterers (Silverman, Klinger, Lust-
bader, Farrel, & Martin, 1972), homosexual males (Silverman, 
Kwawer, Wolitzky, & Caron, 1973), insect phobics (Silver-
man, Frank, & Dachinger, 1974) and overweight women (Silver-
man, Martin, Ungar~ & Mendelsohn, 1978). In a review of 
his work, Silverman (1976) concludes that the results offer 
strong support for the psychoanalytic notion that conflicts 
occurring below awareness can account for many specific 
symptomatologies. Given the complexity o£ many of the 
stimuli used and the wide range of behavioral effects 
observed, these results are not easily explained by most 
current theories of visual information processing (e.g., 
Neisser, 1967). 
Despite a prodigious outpouring of supportive 
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research from Silverman's laboratory, ·the few independent 
replications of his work found in the literature have 
obtained disappointing results (Greenberg, 1917; Emmelkamp 
& Straatman, 1976). In an attempt to encourage replication 
and to demonstrate the effects of the method on a type of 
behavior not previously studied, Silverman, Ross, Adler 
and Lustig (1978} report results of four experiments using 
a relatively simple methodology and college males as sub-
jects. The major intention of each experiment was to manipu-
late, through subliminal presentation of conflict-related 
material, the degree of oedipal conflict in the subjects 
and to observe the effects of this on subjects' accuracy 
in dart-throwing competition. Thus, the study purports to 
test the psychoanalytic proposition that males can uncon-
sciously inhibit themselves in competitive performance 
because winning has the hidden connotation of defeating 
father for mother's love {Beisser, 1961). The_ goal of the 
first part of the present investigation is to replicate 
as exactly as possible the major parts of this study. 
In order to better understand the psychological 
processes involved in this phenomenon 1 the second part of 
the present study will extend the original findings to 
investigate which elements of the original stimuli are 
necessary to produce the experimental effects. To test 
whether the specifically oedipal elements of the stimuli 
are essential, reference to defeating father will be 
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eliminated in a further set of stimuli. Finally, reference 
to competition will be eliminated and only a non-specific 
behavioral injunction included in an additional set of 
stimuli. These procedures provide a partial test of Silver-
man's hypothesis that activation of an unconscious oedipal 
conflict is necessary to explain the results of the original 
experiments. 
In order to place Silverman's research program in 
historical perspective, earlier studies using the subliminal 
perception paradigm to test various psychoanalytic proposi-
tions are reviewed in the following section. This is fol-
lowed by a summary of methodological and theoretical 
criticisms of the paradigm and then a critical review of 
Silverman's work. Methods and results of the current study 
are presented in subsequent sections. Finally, results 
are discussed as they bear on issues in subliminal percep-
tion research, visual information processing, and psycho-
analytic personality theory. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERA'I'URE 
Dixon {1971) has traced the notion of subliminal 
perception to the writings of Dernocritus, Plato, and 
Aristotle. Systematic research is generally considered to 
have begun with Suslowa's (1863; cited by Wolitzky & 
Wachtel, 1973) study of the effects of weak electrical 
stimulation upon the two-point thresholdr and Pierce and 
Jastrow's (1884; cited by Dixon, 1971) finding that sub-
jects judged weights at a better than chance rate even when 
they expressed no subjective confidence in their judgments. 
Guided by Freud's notion of the role of day residue in 
dream formation, Poetzl (1917/1960) published an important 
study in which subjects were exposed to pictures of land-
scapes tachistoscopically and asked to draw and describe 
what they had seen. Parts of the stimulus that were un-
noticed following tachistoscopic exposure £reguently 
appeared in the content of subjects' dreams later that 
night. Except for replications of Poetzl's study by 
Malamud and Linder (1931} and Allers and Telers (1924/1960}, 
little was published in the area until the 1950s. 
The voluminous literature on subliminal perception 
5 
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published since that time can be divided into three main 
lines of investigation (Wolitzky & Wachtel, 1973). The 
first line of research, usually undertaken within the 
orientation of psychophysics or signal detection theory, 
attempts to determine the information-processing limits of 
the perceptual apparatus. Bevan's (1964) experiments on 
the effect of subliminal anchors upon psychophysical judg-
ments are typical of this research. A second line has 
grown from the classical conditioning paradigm. These 
studies usually look at verbal conditioning without aware-
ness, focusing largely on establishing experimental 
analogues of therapeutically effective learning (e.g., 
Greenspoon, 1955; Spielberger, 1962). These two areas of 
research have been periodically reviewed (Adams, 1957; 
McConnell, Cutler, & McNeil_, 1958; Bevan, 1964; Dixon, 1971) 
and so will not be considered here. 
The third line of research stems largely from "Ne\v 
Look" approaches to perception. Beginning with HcGinnies 
(1949) report that taboo words had elevated recognition 
thresholds compared to other words, many studies followed 
which investigated the relationship between perception and 
personality processes. Much of this research was guided 
by psychoanalytic notions of preconscious and unconscious 
thinking, primary and secondary process thinking, and con-
flict and defense. For example, recent work by Erdelyi and 
Kleinbard (1978) and Erdelyi and Goldberg (in press) bears 
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on psychoanalytic notions of repression and the retriev-
ability of lost ("unconscious") memories. 
Among New Look investigations using a subliminal 
perception paradigm, perhaps the theoretical and empirical 
work of George Klein (1959, 1967) is most significant. 
Klein (1970) was interested in the issue of the differential 
effects of peripheral versus focal awareness of stimuli and 
ideas. He proposed the model of "schema activation" (Klein 
& Holt, 1960) by which subliminal or incidental inputs are 
likely to activate drive-related ideas and lead to behavioral 
effects under certain subject and stimulus conditions. As 
will be seen, Silverman's (1976) recent work on "subliminal 
psychodynamic activation" appears closely related to ideas 
advanced by Klein. Before considering Silverman's research 
program however, a partial review of studies usi~g the 
subliminal perception paradigm to test various psycho-
,. 
analytic hypotheses and a consideration of methodological 
and theoretical criticisms of the paradigm are advanced. 
Psychoanalytic Theory and Subliminal 
Perception Research 
As Pine (1964) notes, a major reason for interest 
in the effects of subliminal or incidental (outside focal 
awareness) stimuli has been the hope that this research 
would permit controlled study of thought processes operating 
outside of awareness. Much of the research was guided by 
the notions of primary and secondary process thinking and 
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the role of day residue in dream formation advanced by 
Freud (1900/1967, Chapter VII). In order to study the 
workings of these hypothesized processes, several different 
methods for presenting stimuli have been used. In some 
studies {e.g., Pine, 1961), the critical stimuli are pre-
sented at above threshold intensities, while the subjects' 
attention is diverted to a separate focal task. As stimuli 
are not presented at a level below an independently deter-
mined threshold, this method is more properly termed "inci-
dental" stimulation {see Dixon, 1971, for further discussion). 
Other studies (e.g., Klein, Spence, Holt, & Gourevitch, 
1958) have used a backward masking method involving exposure 
of one (A) stimulus immediately followed by exposure of 
another (B) stimulus which is supraliminal. The effect of 
the unreported A-stimulus on subjects' reactions to the 
B-stimulus is analyzed. The most frequently used method 
involves presentation of stimuli at intensities or durations 
below some independently determined threshold of awareness 
(e.g., Spence & Holland, 1962; all of Silverman's work). 
Early research in the area (reviewed by Pine, 1964) appears 
based on the assumption that stimuli presented by any of 
these methods would bypass the mechanisms that govern the 
intake of supraliminal stimuli. Being less subject to 
critical judgment and inhibitory control, these stimuli 
were assumed to more directly effect preconscious and pri-
mary process mental events. By looking at the influence of 
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these stimuli on behavior, it was hoped that the workings 
of these thought processes would become more clear. 
Wolitzky and Wachtel (1973) note that the influence 
of subliminal stimulation has been demonstrated on a wide 
variety of behaviors including: trait attributions (Klein, 
Spence, Holt, & Gourevitch, 1958; Eagle, 1959i Smith, 
Spence, & Kelin, 1959), drawings (Klein, et al., 1958), 
guessing (Spence, 1961), reaction time (Spence & Bressler, 
1962), visual illusions (Smith & Henriksson, 1955), bias 
in intentional recall (Spence & Holland, 1962; Spence, 
1964), TAT-like stories (Pine, 1960, 1961), Rorschach con-
tent (Silverman & Silverman, 1964), and formal aspects of 
thought (Silverman, 1967). 1 
The influence of subliminal stimulation on dreams, 
images, and free associations has probably been most exten-
sively studied. In the first study on this topic, Poetzl 
{1917/1960) exposed pictures of landscapes tachistoscopically 
for about 1/100 of a second and asked subjects to draw and 
describe what they had seen. Poetzl found that parts of 
the stimulus that were unnoticed following tachistoscope 
exposure tended to appear later in dream content. Allers 
and Teler (1924/1960) extended Poetzl's findings using free-
1Given the large number of studies to be discussed, 
no attempt will be made here to analyze individual studies 
on methodological or theoretical grounds. Instead, criti-
cisms applicable to many of the studies are discussed in the 
following section. Then, the work of Silverman is critically 
examined in some detail. 
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association and imagery tasks the day following stimulus 
exposure. 
Since then, a number of investigators have pursued 
these findings further. Fisher (1954) showed that unnoticed 
parts of tachistoscopically presented pictures tended to 
appear in dreams and suggested that these stimulus elements 
were influenced by unconscious wishes and primary-process 
transformations. Using more rigorous techniques of threshold 
measurement, scoring criteria, and statistical analysis, he 
later demonstrated the effect of subliminal stimuli on both 
dream and image content (Fisher & Paul, l959i Paul & Fisher, 
1959). Shevrin and Lubarsky (1958) reported supporting 
evidence and found that noticed aspects of the stimuli were 
also included in dreams. 
Eriksen (1960) criticized the foregoing studies for 
ignoring the issue of base rates for appearance of ideas in 
fantasy without prior stimulation. A related problem is __ 
that if a subject perceives even only one element of the 
stimulus correctly (e.g., a boat), he is bound to fantasy 
other objects (e.g., a lake, pier} normally associated with 
the perceived object. As some of these associated objects 
are likely to have been in the original picture, a spurious 
"emergence" effect may arise which has nothing to do with 
below-threshold perception of the previously unreported 
elements. Eriksen also notes that subjects may have dif-
ferent criteria for reporting what they saw right after 
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exposure and for reports following an imagery task. Thus, 
"recovery" effects may reflect only a lower confidence 
criterion for report. Incorporating some of the controls 
suggested by Eriksen (1960), Hilgard {1962) investigated 
whether fantasy experience might facilitate recovery of 
initially unreported elements in a post-fantasy intentional 
recall task. Ambiguous results were obtained as judges 
rarely had great assurance that genuine recoveries were 
being scored. Johnson and Eriksen (1961) obtained no sub-
liminal recovery effect in a replication of the Shevrin and 
Lubarsky ~1958) study with controls for base-rate production 
of stimulus related ideas. Dixon (1971) argues however that 
this failure to replicate may be due to the limited oppor-
tunities subjects had to demonstrate recovery. 
In carefully controlled studies which appear to 
have met Eriksen's (1960) criticisms, Giddan (1967) and 
Haber and Erdelyi (1967) demonstrated subjects' recovery 
of initially unavailable material. In the Haber and 
Erdelyi study, the experimental group saw a picture briefly, 
attempted to recall it, then gave extensive free associa-
tions, followed by a second recall attempt. Two control 
groups were used. A "dart-control" group played darts 
instead of free associating, and a "yoked-control" group 
was shown the initial recall attempts of experimental sub-
jects rather than the original stimuli, and then treated 
identically to the experimental group. Comparisons of 
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initial and post-association recall drawings shovled that 
the improvement in recall of the experimental group was 
superior to that of either control group, indicating that 
free associations resulted in the recovery of initially 
unavailable material. The results were taken to support 
the psychoanalytic hypothesis that below-conscious psychic 
material continues to influence and manifest itself in a 
variety of behaviors. They also support the therapeutic 
claim that free-association (or other fantasy production 
techniques) aids in the recovery of below-conscious material. 
In the same vein, Erdelyi's more recent work (e.g., Erdelyi 
& Kleinbard, 1978) has focused on the growth of recall for 
pictures (and not words) over periods of up to one week 
after initial stimulus presentation. 
The foregoing studies on recovery of initially un-
available material stem originally from Freud's {1900/1967) 
theory of the role of day residue (unnoticed stimuli) in 
dream formation. Here, barely noticed, unassimilated 
sensory impressions of the day are "selected 11 for dream 
content because of their resonance with unconscious wishes. 
They emerge in the dream as derivative representations of 
the wish owing to the requirements of censorship and nature 
of unconscious thinking. A somewhat different perspective 
for looking at subliminal perception research stems loosely 
from Freud's (1900/1967, 1911/1958) distinction between 
primary process (primitive, non-logical, and drive-
13 
dominated) and secondary process {intentional, reality-
oriented) thinking. Klein's (1959, 1967) work on the inter-
action of central and peripheral trains of thought reflects 
this perspective. For Klein (1967), an important problem 
was specifying the conditions under which peripheral idea-
tion will intrude upon or become incorporated into conscious, 
intentional thinking. He hoped to shed light on the role of 
consciousness in thinking (Klein & Holt, 1960) and to 
specify the conditions determining behavioral effects of 
peripherally aroused trains of thought. Assuming that 
subliminal stimulation would arouse peripheral trains of 
thought, the strategy here was to compare the effects of 
subliminal or incidental stimuli to those of supraliminal 
or focal stimuli. 
Examination of studies which directly compare rthe 
effects of subliminal and supraliminal stimulation gives 
no clear-cut answer to the question of whether and how 
these effects differ. As noted earlier, Poetzl's (1917/ 
1960) claim that unnoticed stimuli were more likely than 
noticed stimuli to appear in subsequent dreams was refuted 
by Shevrin and Luborsky (1958). Fisher {1960) presents 
evidence suggesting that inclusion of a stimulus in a 
dream is a complex interaction between awareness versus 
nonawareness of the stimulus, subject's conflicts and 
defenses, and meaning of the stimulus to the subject. 
Similarly, Spence and Ehrenberg (1964) found that food 
14 
deprivation was the key variable related to bias in recall, 
whether the stimulus "cheese" was presented above or below 
threshold. 
r--------, 
Discussing the range of subliminal effects, Pine 
(1964} introduced the distinction between "direct" and 
"indirect" effects of stimuli. Direct effects are those 
that appear to have a relatively close or logical relation-
ship to the initial stimulus, though are not literal 
replicas o! it. For example, Zuckerman (1960) found that 
subliminal presentation of the messages "write more" or 
"don't write" resulted in significantly longer or shorter 
TAT stories. Interestingly, supraliminal presentations of 
the stimuli produced no consistent differences in story 
lengths. Here, it appears that supraliminal stimuli can 
be used as appropriate or discarded as irrelevant depending 
on the subject's intentions. Smith, Spence and Klein 
(1959) presented either the word "happy" or "angry" masked 
by a supraliminal picture of a face that was affectively 
neutral. The stimulus words biased responses towards more 
positive or more negative descriptions of the face, though 
the words themselves were rarely used in descriptions. 
Instead, common associates and words logically related to 
the stimulus words were often used, while remote symbolic 
associates were not. 
Indirect effects are those which 9rfe not obviously 
related to the initial stimulus. They include symbolic 
' 
15 
transformations of the original stimulus and often suggest 
primary process thinking (i.e., use of condensation, 
symbolization, displacement). Pine (1960) illustrated 
ind1rect effects in a study where subjects read a focal 
passage while overhearing another passage read in an 
adjacent room (incidental stimulus). Though the focal 
passage (emphasizing the phallic-aggressive aspects of a 
hook) influenced subsequent TAT stories in an undistorted 
manner, the incidental passage (emphasizing the oral-passive 
aspects of a cow) emerged in an indirect, distorted manner. 
Indirect effects included an increase in themes of passive 
and nurturant human relationships, but not an increase in 
cow-like content. Reviewing this issue, Wol\itzky and 
Wachtel (1973) conclude that while indirect effects are 
less likely with supraliminal stimuli, subliminal stimuli 
can give rise to both direct and indirect effects given 
appropriate respons·e measures. The issue of the differen-
tial effects of subliminal versus supraliminal stimuli 
appears to be a complex one probably involving other 
variables such as subjects' current drive state and inten-
tional set. 
Numerous other studies have investigated subject 
variables and stimulus conditions which facilitate or 
inhibit subliminal effects. These have been recently 
reviewed by Wolitzky and Wachtel (1973) and by Dixon (1971) 
who concludes that subliminal effects are facilitated when 
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subjects are in a low state of arousal, attention is 
unselective or broadened, and cognitions are intuitive, 
global, symbolic, and unbound by logical restraints. These 
conclusions have recently been complicated by Sackeim, 
Packer, and Gur's (1977) report of an interaction between 
hemisphericity and induced cognitive set ("intuitive" or 
"analytic") on subliminal effects. 
Of the models advanced by various psychoanalytic 
writers to explain these results, the most representative 
is the "schema activation" model proposed by Klein and 
Holt (1960). They define a schema as an organized group of 
memory traces, including both conceptual associates and 
drive-related derivatives. They assume that every perceptual 
process includes scanning of memory schemata so that in-
coming stimuli can be recognized and take on meaning. 
Further, any schema may be activated by: (a) sets or 
anticipations, (b) the scanning process that selects traces 
which match incoming stimuli, and (c) connections to drives. 
The results of Poetzl (1917/1960) and followers are inter-
preted by Klein and Holt to indicate that stimuli can 
activate relevant schema and lead to behavioral effects even 
if they are not consciously noticed. Stimuli that make 
contact with an active drive schema seem to have an advan-
tage for recovery. They note that in masking studies, the 
first or A-stimulus will activate certain schemas. If these 
are relevant to some ambiguous property of the second or 
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B-stimulus, reactions to the second stimulus will be biased. 
If the stimulus is a brief flash, the authors write that it 
may emerge into imagery if the subject can suspend real-
istic, problem-oriented thinking. Thus, schema activated 
by the stimulus become more available relative to other 
schema. 
The foregoing model is part of a larger theoretical 
framework (Klein, 1967) which assumes that in addition to 
conscious concerns and focal intentions, there are concur-
rent trains of thought in a state of activation that also 
make claims on response channels. In so far as subliminal 
or incidental stimulation can be considered to activate 
these peripheral trains of thought, the method offers a way 
to study their emergence in various response channels. 
Critiques of the Subliminal 
Perception Paradigm 
Many of the studies reviewed above could have been 
criticized on various grounds, the most common being small 
sample size, weak or ambiguous results, and lack of inde-
pendent replication. In addition, many studies fail to 
report relevant details such as illumination levels, stim-
ulus size and contrast, method for determining threshold, 
and length of dark adaption. Because of these problems and 
an unknown number of negative results, the results of these 
studies must be regarded as tentative and interpreted with 
caution. The sequence of subliminal studies suggests that 
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researchers are often dissatisiied with weak results, think 
of some possible mediating variable and control for it in a 
subsequent study. Even if positive results are then 
obtained, systematic investigations of the new variable and 
replications are rarely reported. This apparent pattern 
has resulted in a plethora of variables possibly relevant 
to subliminal effects with little systematic knowledge about 
any one. Further, little attention is paid to establishing 
the reliab~lity of earlier studies. Although there has 
recently been increased acceptance of the phenomenon due to 
use of signal detection techniques and persuasive theoretical 
accounts (e.g., Dixon, 1971; Erdelyi, 1974; Walker, 1978}, 
some writers continue to question the validity of the con-
cept (e.g., Neisser, 1967; Wiener & Kleespies, 1968). 
Before discussing the research program of Silverman 
and associates, it will be helpful to review the major 
methodological and theoretical criticims that have been 
directed towards subliminal perception research. The pur-
pose here is not to evaluate the overall validity of the 
paradigm (see Dixon, 1971) but to lay the groundwork for 
judging the merits of a particular research program. 
In his review of the literature on discrimination 
and learning without awareness, Eriksen (1960) notes that 
terms like "conscious," "unconscious," and "awareness" are 
often defined differently across studies. Especially impor-
tant to studies using an absolute threshold paradigm is the 
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operational definition of threshold of awareness. Eriksen 
notes that this is usually defined in terms of subjects' 
verbal report, thus placing a burden on the adequacy of 
the language to reflect the richness of perceptual experi-
ence. Thus, the threshold of a given subject depends on 
several variables, including: adequacy of the experimenter's 
questions, use or lack of use of a ready signal, whether or 
not a forced-choice format is employed, and the adequacy of 
the scale used to classify subjects' answers. He suggests 
that drawings or use of forced-choice methods may reveal 
that subjects are aware of more than they can verbally 
report. 
Bevan (1964) and Eriksen (1960) note that threshold 
is a statistical estimate of something that varies over time 
and is commonly defined as the point at which a subject cor-
rectly discriminates (either a stimulus from a blank field 
or one stimulus from another) at a 50 percent rate. Because 
of this, subjects may sometimes be aware of the stimulus 
even when presented below this level. This could create 
the false impression of a subliminal effect. Clearly, the 
subliminal stimulus should be presented at a level below the 
range of values from which the threshold was derived. In 
response to these cogent criticisms and suggestions for 
determining threshold, many recent studies (e.g., Zwosta & 
Zenhausern, 1969) have employed more rigorous threshold pro-
cedures using signal detection techniques to separate sensi-
tivity from criterion factors. 
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Studies using a masking paradigm have also been 
criticized by Eriksen (1960) for rarely including careful 
threshold determinations {e.g., Smith, Spence, & Klein, 
1958). He notes that in the study cited, some control sub-
jects alerted to the fact that words would be flashed prior 
to the picture were able to detect the A-stimulus. Neisser 
(1967) criticizes the backward masking paradigm on evolu-
tionary grounds. Given the specialized nature and unusual-
ness of backward masking, he doubts that evolution would 
have ~pped the mind with unconscious mechanisms for 
dealing with it. Dixon (1971) counters this argument 
claiming that natural selection probably favored organisms 
losing the least information from the environment. 
Neisser (1967) also criticizes the Smith, et al. 
(1958) study for the possibility that "demand character-
istics" were operating. In particular, he points out that 
the experimenter may have known the order of the A-stimulus 
exposures and so influenced subjects' reports of the B-
stimulus accordingly. In the same vein, he criticizes 
studies using free association measures where the experi-
menter knows which are the critical cue words. Significant 
here is the attempted replication of Spence (1964) by Bruel, 
Ginsberg, Lukomnik, and Schmeidler (1966). Using the same 
free association task as the original experiment, they 
obtained non-significant results when using an experimenter 
naive to the hypothesis. However, an informed experimenter 
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instructed to emphasize the critical cue words also obtained 
non-significant results. As Dixon (1971) notes, the 
mechanisms underlying the alleged operation of "demand char-
acteristics" in these studies are unknown and may involve 
communication processes on the same order of mysteriousness 
as subliminal perception. In any event, experimental con-
trols guarding against this possibility are necessary for 
straightforward interpretation of results. 
Perhaps the most cogent criticism (at least the most 
publically debated) of the subliminal perception paradigm 
is that the availability of partial stimulus cues may 
account for the observed effects. Advanced by Goldiamond 
(1958) and Eriksen (1960) as a possible explanation of per-
ceptual defense studies, the position is stated most clearly 
by Kempler and Wiener (1963). The later authors draw a dis-
tinction between one-process and two-process views of per-
ception. Briefly, the two-process view (their example, 
Klein, et al., 1958) assumes the existence of two relatively 
independent perceptual processes; a supraliminal one oper-
ating within awareness and a subliminal one operating out-
side awareness. Further, the subliminal process can make 
affective or evaluative reactions to the stimulus before 
the subject can discriminate and report it. Thus, the 
meaning of a stimulus is apprehended prior to correct recog-
nition. The one-process view posits a single perceptual 
process described by a monotonic relationship between 
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stimulus intensity or duration and response strength. Thus, 
lowered stimulus intensity will lead to impoverished 
responses, but is not expected to produce qualitatively dif-
ferent responses. Kempler and Wiener argue that, in studies 
obtaining subliminal effects, refined threshold procedures 
would reveal the availability of partial cues to which sub-
jects respond in a predictable manner. Differences in 
response to weak inputs are seen by the authors as "a func-
tion of differential response characteristics of a subject 
(or between subjects) to the specific seen part cues (1963, 
p. 352, their emphasis)." 
Guthrie and Wiener (1966) offered empirical evidence 
for the "part-cue response-characteristic" model as a 
tenable explanation of results obtained by Eagle (1959). 
Eagle used the masking paradigm in which either an aggres-
sive or benevolent picture was immediately followed by 
supraliminal exposure of a neutral picture. Subjects' 
ratings of the neutral picture varied syst.ematically with 
the different masked stimuli. Noting that the two masked 
stimuli appeared to vary in structural attributes as well 
as in content, Guthrie and Wiener asked subjects to rate 
supraliminal presentations of line drawings varying in 
angularity and line thickness. As predicted, angular lines 
were rated negatively while curved lines were rated posi-
tively. To show that this structural cue may have been 
available to Eagle's subjects, they demonstrated that sub-
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jects rated the original aggressive stimulus as more angular 
than the benevolent stimulus when presented in an ascending 
series (starting below threshold). Finally, they constructed 
stimuli which varied in angularity and thematic content 
(presence or absence of a gun) and presented these as 
stimuli masked by an ambiguous supraliminal stimulus. As 
predicted, subjects' ratings of the ambiguous stimulus 
varied significantly with the angularity of the masked 
stimulus and not with the presence or absence of the gun. 
In addition, the closer to recognition threshold the angular 
masked stimulus was presented, the more negative ratings 
were given. The authors conclude that predictable differences 
in response to available structural cues can account for the 
behavior ascribed to subliminal perception. 
Responding to this study, Silverman and Spiro (1967) 
collected subjects' ratings of angularity of aggressive and 
neutral stimuli used in earlier studies which obtained pre-
dicted subliminal effects (e.g., Silverman, 1965). For 
both exposures in ascending series and at durations used 
in the experiments proper, the aggressive stimuli were 
never judged to be significantly more angular than the 
neutral stimuli. In three comparisons, neutral stimuli 
were judged more angular, contrary to Guthrie and Wiener's 
{1966) findings. Silverman and Spiro also note several 
studies (e.g., Spence & Holland, 1962; Fiss, Goldberger, & 
Klein, 1963; Silverman & Silverman, 1964) that employed a 
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"discrimination task" in response to the partial-cue criti-
cisms of Eriksen (1960) and others. In this task, experi-
mental and control stimuli are presented randomly under the 
same tachistoscopic conditions as they were in the experi-
ment proper and the subject's task is to tell them apart 
(without having to identify them). If stimuli are yielding 
different partial cues, a better than chance discrimination 
presumably should be made. Though significant subliminal 
effects were obtained in these studies, almost no subjects 
were able to make this discrimination. Silverman and Spiro 
report that the subjects who could make the discrimination 
tended to show less subliminal effect than the majority 
who could not. Additionally, they cite a study by Spence 
and Holland (1962) which suggested that the availability of 
partial-cues significantly interfered with subliminal 
effects. 
In a somewhat philosophical rejoinder, Wiener and 
Kleespies (1968) argue that one can never "prove" that somP 
supraliminal cues are not available. Their position states 
that some cues are available, not necessarily angularity, 
which could account for observed effects. Finally, Silver-
man (1968) replies by claiming that part-cue adherents need 
to demonstrate structural differences between pairs of 
neutral and critical stimuli and also that these differences 
are likely to emerge during the experiment proper (e.g., 
by a "discrimination task"). Clearly, part-cue theory has 
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difficulty explaining how subjects can react differently to 
supraliminal cues of two stimuli when they are unable to 
tell whether the stimuli are the same or different. 
The final criticism of the subliminal perception 
paradigm to be considered is that it implies some sort of 
"pre-perceiver" or "little-man-inside-the-head" that per-
ceives and reacts to stimuli before they are consciously 
experienced. This debate appears to stem from different 
orientations towards psychology and semantic biases. For 
example, Eriksen's (1960) implication of a "superdiscrimin-
ating unconscious" seems to imply more of a homunculus than 
does Dixon's (1971, p. 90} "antecedent physiological 
processes which do not have phenomenal representation." 
Erdelyi (1974} suggests that this problem is ameliorated if 
the phenomenon is understood in information-processing 
terms. He argues: 
that a system with control processes for internal regu-
lation, including regulation of input, violates no 
sacrosanct edict of science, nor does it imply the 
literal existence of little men or demons in the head 
(1974 I P· 4). 
Acceptance of these sorts of internal control 
processes does not imply acceptance of subliminal percep-
tion however. Neisser (1967) argues that the pre-attentive 
processes implicated by this view are cruder and less 
accurate than focal ones and so could not be expected to 
operate at an input level below that for attentive (i.e., 
conscious) processes. For the same reason, they could not 
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be expected to recognize and react to the meaning of stimuli 
prior to conscious recognition. The results of some sub-
liminal studies (particularly those of Silverman) certainly 
do implicate some very complex and accurate processes 
occurring at below conscious levels. To account for these 
results, Dixon (1971) offers an information-processing model 
involving multiple inputs giving rise to preconscious 
parallel processing. Following a microgenetic view of per-
ception (Werner, 1948), he posits a stage in perceptual 
processing where meaning is extracted while naming is im-
possible. As additional evidence of this stage, he offers 
observations of aphasics who clearly recognize but cannot 
name objects. He suggests that impoverished stimulation, 
as well as cortical damage, may operate to stop perceptual 
processing at this preconscious level. 
In conclusion, the debate over subliminal perception 
has ranged across many psychological viewpoints for more 
than two decades. Perhaps the primary reason for the abun-
dance of debate is the frequency of poorly controlled 
studies which show weak or ambiguous subliminal effects. 
This is complicated by the apparently small range of stimulus 
values between which the phenomenon is demonstrable (Hilgard, 
1962). Secondly, the idea of subliminal perception has 
often appeared to contradict common sense notions of per-
ception (e.g., "If I cannot see it, I cannot react to it.") 
and many epistemological assumptions about perception and 
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behavior (e.g., Wiener & Kleespies' [1968] "realism in per-
ception" position). Nonetheless, the paradigm has gained 
increasing acceptance as theoretical viewpoints have changed 
(Dixon, 1971) and the part-processes hypothetically under-
lying the phenomenon are better understood (e.g., Moray, 
1970). How several of the criticisms mentioned above apply 
to the research program of Silverman and associates will be 
examined in the following section. 
Silverman's Research on 
"Subliminal Psychodynamic Activation" 
Within the context of attempts to clarify and vali-
date some aspects of psychoanalytic theory, Silverman and his 
collaborators at New York University have published over 
twenty-five studies (summarized in Silverman, 1976) using 
a laboratory technique termed "subliminal psychodynamic 
activation." The theory behind this technique derives from 
Freud's model of unconscious conflict and defense as they 
relate to psychopathological symptomatology. Following 
Klein and Holt's (1960) emphasis on the importance of the 
drive-relevance of subliminal stimuli, Silverman (1976) 
assumes that a stimulus containing wish-related content 
makes contact with derivatives of the related wish if the 
wish is currently active in the person. Thus, the sub-
liminal input produces an effect analagous to that of an 
internally generated increase in intensity of an unconscious 
wish. In line with Pine's (1964) notion of indirect sub-
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liminal effects and the theory of psychodynamic defenses, 
Silverman argues that the ideas and images activated by 
this input are likely to be transformed so that their wish-
related character is obscured. They are thus not expected 
to directly come into awareness but rather to press for 
expression without the person's awareness. For Silverman, 
this is evidenced by increases or decreases in the psycho-
pathological symptoms related to the unconscious wish, the 
direction depending on whether the stimulus has conflict-
intensifying or conflict-alleviating connotations. 
The idea of activation of an unconscious wish or 
conflict suggests that the pr~sent paradigm is closely 
related to the more comprehensive "schema activation" model 
proposed by Klein and Holt (1960). As noted earlier, 
Klein's (1970) programmatic research interest was to explore 
the interactions between peripheral and focal trains of 
thought. His work was directed towards understanding the 
cognitive and perceptual processes involved and specifying 
the conditions under which an incidental input effects 
behavior and conscious experience. In contrast, Silverman 
(1977) appears to implic1itly accept a model of how sub-
liminal input can affect behavior and goes on to use the 
technique to test specific hypotheses about psychopathology. 
His goal has been to validate and clarify psychoanalytic 
propositions relating particular symptoms (e.g., depression) 
to particular unconscious conflicts (e.g., aggression turned 
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towards the self). Before looking at the results of this 
research, the experimental method is reviewed. 
Essentially, the effect on psychopathological 
behavior of subliminal presentation of wish-related stimuli 
is compared to that of subliminal presentation of (rela-
tively) neutral stimuli. Sessions typically begin with a 
11 baseline" assessment of subjects' propensity for whatever 
behavior is being studied. This is followed by 4-msec 
tachist~scopic exposures to conflict-related or neutral 
stimuli. Both pictorial and verbal stimuli are shown four 
times for each condition and both experimenter and subject 
are blind to stimulus content. A re-assessment of patho-
logical behavior follows the tachistoscope presentations. 
This procedure is repeated for other neutral and critical 
stimuli in the same session or the next day. Silverman 
(1976) reports predicted results on a variety of behaviors, 
including thought process, feeling state, speech disorder, 
non-verbal behavior, and sexual attraction. 
The bulk of the earlier studies in this program were 
directed towards investigating the role of aggressive wishes 
and merging fantasies in schizophrenic symptomatology (sum-
marized in Silverman, 1975). A variety of aggressive and 
\ 
neutral stimuli were used, e.g., a lion charging versus a 
bird flying, man holding a dagger versus a man reading a 
newspaper, and the verbal stimuli CANNIBAL EATS PERSON ver-
sus PEOPLE ARE WALKING. Generally, the aggressive stimuli 
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led to increased pathological behavior measured by Rorschach 
content, TAT stories, word' associations, and a six-point 
scale measuring "non-verbal pathological behavior" (e.g., 
inappropriate laughter) . Later studies suggested that the 
effect was a delayed one (Silverman, 1971) and that it was 
more reliably obtainable with long-term rather than short-
term schizophrenic patients (Silverman & Candell, 1970). 
Other studies (e.g., Silverman, Spiro, Weisberg, & 
Candell, 1969) report that subliminal presentation of the 
message MOMMY AND I ARE ONE (a "symbiotic-gratification 
fantasy") led to a decrease in pathological behavior among 
differentiated but not undifferentiated schizophrenics. 
Silverman (1977) reports unpublished findings (Kaplan, 1976; 
Kaye, 1975} suggesting these amelioriative effects are 
specific to this message as several closely related mes-
sages (e.g., MOMMY IS ALWAYS WITH ME) had no effect on 
pathological behavior. These results are interpreted to 
support the hypotheses that symbiotic fantasy gratificatioL 
reduces pathology in schizophrenics while activation of 
aggressive fantasy intensifies pathological manifestations. 
Further studies have investigated psychoanalytic 
hypotheses relating specific stimulus content to depression, 
homosexuality, stuttering, and competition. Rutstein and 
Goldberger (1973) found that presentation of aggressive 
stimuli led to significantly higher self-ratings of depres-
sion but to no change in Rorschach measures of "aggression 
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directed inward" among non-psychotic depressed patients. 
Supporting the psychoanalytic hypothesis that homosexuality 
involves (in part) a flight from incest, Silverman, Kwawer, 
Wolitzky, and Coron (1973) found that stimuli containing 
incestuous themes produced an increase in homosexual and a 
decrease in heterosexual feelings reported by a group of 
homosexual males. In another study (Silverman, Klinger, 
Lustbader, Farrel, & Martin, 1.972), stuttering was found 
to increase after subliminal presentations of anal content 
as compared to neutral content. Finally, Silverman, Ross, 
Adle4mrl Lustig (1978) found competitive behavior (dart 
throwing) was effected by oedipally-related stimuli that 
either sanctioned or condemned the idea of defeating father. 
For Silverman (1976, 1977), these results support particu-
lar psychoanalytic notions relating forms of pathology to 
specific unconscious wishes and conflicts. 
Noting that many of these results could be explained 
by the generally negative affective quality of the various 
stimuli rather than their specific meaningful content, 
Silverman, Bronstein, and Mendelsohn (1976) tested new 
groups of stutterers, homosexuals, depressives, and schizo-
phrenics. Each subject was subliminally exposed to three 
sets of stimuli: (a) the "relevant" wish-related stimulus 
(aggressive for the schizophrenics and depressives, incest 
for the homosexuals, and anal for the stutterers); (b) an 
I 
"irrelevant" wish-related stimulus, but one that intensi-
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fied the symptoms of one of the other groups (incest for 
schizophrenics and stutterers, aggressive for the homo-
sexuals, and anal for the depressives); and (c) a neutral-
control stimulus. Three of the four groups showed sig-
nificant increases in pathology after exposure to their 
"relevant" wish-related stimulus (depressives showed mixed 
results). In no instance did the "irrelevant" stimulus 
influence the symptom under consideration. These results 
were interpreted as support for the psychoanalytic position 
that symptoms have specific meanings and express an indi-
vidual's struggle with a particular conflictual wish. 
In other recent studies, subliminal presentations 
of the MOMMY AND I ARE ONE stimulus have been shown to en-
hance the effect of various therapeutic modalities with 
overweight women {Silverman, Martin, Ungaro, & Mendelsohn, 
1978) and with insect phobics (Silverman, Frank, & Dachinger, 
1974). Silverman (in press) reports unpublished findings 
(Parker, in preparation) that repeated exposures to this 
stimulus as compared to a neutral one resulted in higher 
exam scores for a group of college students. In perhaps 
his most provocative work to date, Silverman (1978a, in 
press) uses these results and those obtained with oedipally-
related stimuli to advance a thesis regarding the role of 
unconscious fantasy in psychotherapeutic success. In par-
ticular, he posits that certain therapies (e.g., systematic 
desensitization, client-centered therapy, and meditation) 
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are apt to activate symbiotic-gratification fantasies in 
which the therapist is unconsciously perceived as the good 
symbiotic mother. Other therapies (e.g., Masters and 
Johnson type sex therapy, body contact therapies, assertive-
ness training, and encounter treatment) are more likely to 
activate fantasies of sanctioned oedipal gratification in 
which the therapist is unconsciously experienced as a per-
missive superego figure. In light of his research findings 
on the effects of subliminal activation of these two fan-
tasies, Silverman argues that their inadvertant activation 
may play a significant role in the therapeutic success of 
many forms of therapy. 
In sum, Silverman and his associates have put to-
gether one of the most ambitious and voluminous research pro-
grams on subliminal perception to date. More th~n twenty-
five studies have been published while an additional 
thirty studies remain unpublished (Silverman, personal com-
munication). As noted above, these findings may have far-
reaching implications for understanding therapeutic pro-
cesses (Silverman, in press} and for developing new thera-
peutic methods (e.g., Silverman, Martin, Ungaro, & Mendel-
sohn, 1978). Purporting to validate psychoanalytic hypotheses 
about symptom formation and unconscious motivation, the pro-
gram may approach the "promise of a clinical-experimental 
psychology of unconscious phenomena (Wolitzky & Wachtel, 
1974, p. 840)" hoped for by earlier investigators. Cer-
'..)I .• f .. 
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tainly, the experimental results are not readily explained 
by many modern perceptual and visual information-processing 
theories (e.g., Neisser, 1967). Given these implications 
and the claims made by the researchers, the need for care-
ful evaluation and independent replication is clearly indi-
cated. Some general criticisms reflecting on the validity 
and reliability of the overall research program are dis-
cussed next. This is followed by a description of a par-
ticular study with plans for a replication and extension 
of it. 
Perusal of individual studies suggests that experi-
mental results are rarely straightforward and unambiguous. 
This appears especially true for the hypotheses that have 
been most extensively investigated. For example, later 
studies using aggressive stimuli with schizophrenics ob-
tained inconsistent results that were explained in terms of 
a "delayed effect" (Silverman, 1971) and differences 
between long-term and short-term patients (Silverman & 
Candell, 1970). Greenberg (1977) also notes the lack of 
consistency in effect across studies and complains that 
Silverman shifted rather hastily from one measurement 
technique to another without exploring in detail or depth 
the limits of the various measures of effect. In a similar 
vein, Shapiro (1978) notes that studies of symbiotic 
stimuli with schizophrenics have also obtained inconsistent 
results in that significance tends to occur on one or another 
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measure but rarely on all measures used in a study. More-
over, the effects appear on different measures from study 
to study. Shapiro argues that this raises some questions 
as to the nature of the effects and what underlies them. 
Silverman (1978b) replies to this criticism claiming that 
the common effect in these studies was greater adaptive 
functioning after stimulation and that the fact that it is 
found on different measures at different times raises ques-
tions for further research, but does not challenge the 
basic thesis. Silverman appears correct in asserting that 
these inconsistent results raise further research questions. 
His labeling the common effect as "greater adaptive func-
tioning" however, ignores the direct challenge to replica-
bility and reliability posed by these inconsistent results. 
The reader also notes Silverman's tendency to in-
voke personality variables when accounting for inconsistent 
or weak results (e.g., the "deniers" in Silverman, Bron-
stein, & Mendelsohn's [1976] sample of depressives). Thou~h 
these variables may well prove to be important and so 
should be investigated, attention need also be paid to 
specifying the range of stimulus conditions within which 
subliminal effects are obtained. 2 Given other reviewers' 
2 
. h d. G1ven t e present state of knowledge regar 1ng 
subliminal phenomena, it may be argued that it is most 
appropriate to first establish the stimulus parameters for 
which subliminal perception is reliably demonstrable, and 
then to investigate the contributions of personality and 
other mediating variables. 
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(e.g., Dixon, 1971) emphasis on the small range of stimulus 
values for which subliminal effects occur, Silverman's lack 
of careful consideration here is somewhat surprising. For 
example, except for very recent reports (e.g., Silverman, 
Ross, Adler, & Lustig, 1978), this reviewer found no studies 
for which illumination levels were reported for both the 
blank and stimulus fields. Room illumination levels and 
time given for subjects to adapt to tachistoscope lighting 
before subliminal exposures are also notably lacking. 
Finally, details on the construction, brightness, and con-
trast of stimulus cards are usually absent. Beside pro-
hibiting conclusions about the stimulus range of subliminal 
effects, these oversights make exact replication impossible. 
In one attempted replication, Emmelkamp and Straatman 
(1976) found that two of their twenty subjects could exactly 
reproduce the experimental stimuli following 4-msec expo-
sures. 
Except for one footnote (Silverman & Spiro, 1967, 
p. 329) referring to an earlier study {Silverman, 1966) in 
which no significant differences were found between 4-msec 
and 6-msec stimulus exposures, this reviewer found neither 
empirical evidence nor rationale regarding the choice of 
4-msec exposure speeds, durations between exposures {usu-
ally three seconds) or number of exposures {usually four). 
Again, attention to and systematic variation of these 
variables could significantly contribute to understanding 
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what stimulus values underlie subliminal effects. Similarly, 
careful threshold determination procedures are rarely 
reported in the studies. Silverman, Ross, Adler, and Lustig 
(1978) do report threshold data obtained with one of the two 
tachistoscopes used in their study, but fail to specify the 
procedures used to collect the data. As Eriksen (1960) and 
others have noted, differing methods may obtain quite dif-
ferent threshold estimates. Thus, Silverman's data give 
little indication of how far below awareness the reported 
phenomena are demonstrable. 
Many of the criticisms and the results of Emmelkamp 
and Straatman {1976) mentioned above raise a question re-
garding the possibility that partial cues were available 
to subjects in some studies. Silverman and Spiro (1967) 
and Silverman {1968) offer data and persuasive arguments 
against this possibility for {at least) many of their studies. 
Particularly impressive is their report that subjects were 
unable to discriminate between (without having to identify) 
neutral and critical stimuli when presented under the con-
ditions used in several experiments. Unfortunately, the 
discrimination task has not been administered to subjects 
in all studies {e.g., Silverman, Frank & Dachinger, 1974). 
Silverman (1976) marshalls further support against the 
partial-cue hypothesis from several studies in which stimuli 
were presented at both 4-msec and 10 second durations {e.g., 
Rutstein & Goldberger, 1973). In none of the seven studies 
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mentioned did supraliminal exposures lead to significant 
changes in measured pathology while all obtained predicted 
subliminal effects. Though supportive of the subliminal 
hypothesis, findings that subjects react differently to 
completely available stimuli (or to different amounts of 
part-cue availability) cannot disprove the partial-cue 
hypothesis (Wiener & Kleespies, 1968). As an overstated 
example, one can easily imagine that subjects' reactions 
to the part-cue "HI" might differ considerably from those 
to the complete word "SHIT." 
As some of the foregoing criticisms are applicable 
to most or all of the studies considered, the strength and 
reliability of the overall findings is called into ques-
tion. These methodological flaws also create doubt as to 
whether the experiments are valid tests of the psycho-
analytic hypotheses they are purported to test. In this 
regard, investigations testing the specificity of relation-
ships between symptoms and stimulus content (Silverman, 
Bronstein, & Mendelsohn, 1976) and those comparing the 
effects of semantically related stimulus contents (reported 
in Silverman, 1977) are most provocative in their support 
for psychoanalytic hypotheses relative to other hypotheses. 
Given these questions about the reliability of the 
overall findings and the validity of the "subliminal psycho-
dynamic activation" construct hypothesized to underlie the 
results, L~e need for independent replication of any part 
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of this research program is clearly apparent. Silverman 
(personal communication) lists nineteen studies completed 
without his sponsorship. Only three of these have been 
published. Rutstein and Goldberger's (1973) study of 
depressives was completed while Rutstein was a graduate 
student at New York University and obtained inconsistent 
results. The other articles (Greenberg, 1976; Emmelkamp 
& Straatman, 1976) appear in journals published outside 
the United States and essentially fail to replicate 
Silverman's findings. Greenberg (1976) compared the effects 
of aggressive and neutral stimuli with schizophrenics. His 
only significant finding was an increase in a Rorschach 
measure of pathological thinking following exposure of the 
neutral stimulus, opposite Silverman's findings. Emmelkamp 
and Straatman (1976) found no subliminal effect with a 
symbiotic gratification stimulus on snake phobics in an 
attempted replication of Silverman, Frank, and Dachinger 
(1974). Unfortunately, all of these replication attempts 
suffer from many of the same methodological shortcomings 
discussed with regard to the original studies. 
The Present Study 
In an effort to encouragereplication and to demon-
~trate subliminal effects on a type of behavior not pre-
viously studied, Silverman, Ross, Adler, and Lustig (1978) 
report results of four experiments using a relatively simple 
behavioral measure and college males as subjects. The major 
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intention of each experiment was to manipulate, through 
subliminal presentation of conflict-related material, the 
degree of oedipal conflict in the subjects and to observe 
the effects of this on subjects' accuracy in dart-throwing 
competition. Stimuli were chosen either to intensify 
oedipal conflict by condemning the idea of defeating father 
in competition or to alleviate the conflict by sanctioning 
this idea. The verbal message BEATING DAD IS OK was pre-
sented for the sanctioning condition, and BEATING DAD IS 
WRONG was used for the condemning condition. Each message 
was presented following congruous pictures of an older and 
younger man both smiling (sanctioning) or both frowning 
(condemning). Thus, the study purports to test the psycho-
analytic proposition that males can unconsciously inhibit 
themselves in competitive performance because winning has 
the hidden connotation of defeating father for mother's 
love (Beisser, 1961). 
In three of the four experiments, the results 
obtained were consistent with the expectation that exposure 
to the OK stimuli would enhance subsequent dart-throwing 
accuracy while the WRONG stimuli would diminish it. The 
authors note that for these three groups, forty of seventy-
eight subjects (59 percent) obtained adjusted scores for the 
OK condition that were over one hundred points greater than 
their adjusted scores for the WRONG condition. In contrast, 
only one subject had a difference of this magnitude in the 
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opposite direction. For the experiment which failed to 
obtain significant results, uncontrolled illumination 
levels were blamed. A subsequent experiment varied illQ~ina-
tion levels and found that stimuli exposed at higher levels 
failed to produce effects even though stimuli were then 
closer to threshold. Results from a discrimination task 
administered to most subjects following three of the experi-
ments suggest that results cannot be attributed to the 
availability of supraliminal partial cues. 3 
The first part of the present investigation is an 
attempted replication of the major parts of this study. 
Additional information on procedure and copies of the stimuli 
used in the original study were obtained (Silverman, per-
sonal communication). In order to more clearly specify 
stimulus conditions for which the effect occurs, ascending 
threshold data is collected for use in generating the stim-
uli used in the experiment proper. Apparent differences in 
procedure are discussed in the appropriate context. 
In order to better understand the psychological pro-
cesses involved in this phenomenon, the second part of the 
present study extends the original findings to investigate 
which elements of the OK and WRONG stimuli are necessary to 
produce the experimental effects. Silverman (1976) acknowl-
3
unfortunately, the discrimination task was not 
administered following Experiment I which used a three-
field tachistoscope most similar to that used in the 
present study. 
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edges that many of his results could be explained by the 
generally negative affective quality of the various stimuli 
rather than by their specific psychoanalytically-meaningful 
content. Studies comparing the effects of several meaning-
ful stimuli on different clinical groups (Silverman, Bron-
stein, & Mendelsohn, 1978) and studies varying stimulus 
content related to one theme (reported by Silverman, 1976) 
have supported the specificity hypothesized by psychoana-
lysts. The present study attempts to extend these findings 
to the dart-throwing paradigm. To test whether the specif-
ically oedipal elements of the original stimuli are neces-
sary, reference to defeating father is eliminated from a 
further set of stimuli. Thus, the stimuli WINNING DARTS IS 
OK and WINNING DARTS IS WRONG are presented with congruous 
pictures and followed by dart-throwing. Additionally, 
reference to competition is eliminated and only a non-
specific behavioral injunction included. For this, the 
stimuli YOU DO OK and YOU DO WRONG with congruous pictures 
are presented. These procedures provide a partial test of 
Silverman's hypothesis that activation of an unconscious 
oedipal conflict is necessary to explain the original 
results. As a test of the specific relationship between 
competitive behavior and oedipal conflict posited by psycho-
analysts, the results also reflect on the construct validity 
of the "subliminal psychodynamic activation" model. 
CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Subjects for the experiment were thirty-eight males 
from the Loyola University Department of Psychology under-
graduate volunteer pool. Only subjects who spent their 
childhoods in primarily English speaking homes were included 
(Silverman, Ross, Adler, & Lustig, 1978, p. 346). Subjects 
who wear (untinted) glasses or contact lenses for any 
reason were required to wear them during all tachistoscopic 
presentations (Silverman, personal communication). Eighteen 
of these subjects were randomly selected to complete the 
second part of the study. Prior to the actual experiment, 
an additional ten subjects drawn from the same population 
were used for piloting the procedure and for collection of 
threshold data. Subjects' ages ranged from 17 to 25 years, 
with a mean age of 19.0 years and a-'rilode age of 19 years. 
Materials 
The experimental verbal stimuli for the replication 
include: (a) BEATING DAD IS WRONG, and (b) BEATING DAD IS 
OK. Each is printed in letters 1.3-cm high and occupies two 
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lines on a white card. The pictorial stimuli are 4 x 7-cm 
line drawings intended to be congruous with the verbal mes-
sages. Thus, for Stimulus a, the pictorial accompaniment 
consists of a simple line drawing of older and younger male 
figures looking at each other with lips turned downward, 
clearly conveying negative feeling. For Stimulus b, the 
pictorial accompaniment is identical, except that the lips 
are turned up, so that the figures appear to be smiling at 
each other. The baseline stimuli consist of (relatively) 
neutral verbal messages and congruous pictures. They 
include: (a) PEOPLE ARE SITTING, and (b) PEOPLE ARE 
STANDING. How these stimuli were generated from photo-
copies of the stimuli used in the original study will be 
detailed after other materials are discussed. 
As in Experiment I of the original study, the 
stimuli are viewed through an electronically controlled 
Scientific Prototype three-field tachistoscope (Model N-
1000). The viewing distance is 1.3 meters. The exposures 
of verbal message and picture {each from different fields) 
last 4-msec each. The tachistoscope is set up so that when 
the subject looks into the eyepiece, he sees the blank 
field with red fixation dot, which goes off each time the 
stimulus fields go on. After the instructions "Ready, set," 
the picture field is exposed for 4-msec followed by the 
blank field for three seconds followed by the verbal field 
for 4-msec followed again by the blank field. Then, with 
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five seconds of the blank field passing after each pair of 
exposures, this sequence is repeated three times, thus 
giving four pairs of exposures for each condition. 
For the dart-throwing competition, an American-
style dart board identical to that used in the original 
study was hung 96 inches from the throwing line with the 
bottom 58 inches from the floor. The dartboard (manu-
factured by General Sportscraft of Bergenfeld, New Jersey) 
is 18 inches in diameter and divided into seven equal con-
centric circles with the following point allotments: 10, 
20, 30, 40, 60, 80, and 100. One defect should be noted. 
Part of the bullseye (the 100 point area) seems to be made 
of hard wood which the metal darts cannot penetrate. Thus, 
darts hitting this area and bouncing away from the board 
were scored as 100 points. The dart-throwing area is 
situated immediately adjacent to subject's seat for viewing 
the tachistoscope (see Appendix A-I, "Room Diagram"). 
Tachistoscopic illumination levels varied across 
the original experiments and were not reported for Experi-
ment I in which the three-field tachistoscope was used. 
Silverman (personal communication) recommends however that 
the illumination of the stimulus fields be set at between 
four and five footlamberts with blank field and room illumi-
nation two to three times brighter than this. 4 Averaging 
4Experiment II of the original study reports stim-
ulus field illuminations of five footlarnberts with the 
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these figures, stimulus field illuminations were set at 4.5 
footlarnberts, and the blank field at 2.5 times brighter or 
11.25 footlamberts. Illumination measurements were made 
using an Ilford photometer with experimental stimulus cards 
inserted in the fields. All fields were set at "constant-
on" positions while measurements were made. 5 Silverman 
(personal communication) also notes that subjects' exposure 
to glare from room lighting may interfere with subliminal 
registration. For this reason, room lighting was shielded 
from subjects' direct view thereby eliminating the possibil-
ity that glare from the flourescent lighting could effect 
results. Room illumination was measured at 7.6 footlamberts. 
This measurement was taken of the wall which subjects faced 
when seated at the tachistoscope and when throwing darts 
{see Appendix A-I, "Room Diagram"). Finally, light re-
blank field at nine footlamberts. Experiment IV used stim-
ulus fields at five. footlamberts with the blank field at 
fifteen footlamberts. Both experiments used a two-field 
tachistoscope and obtained the predicted effect. 
5It should be noted that after approximately half 
the subjects had been run, a slight flickering appeared in 
the stimulus fields when viewed in the "constant-on" posi-
tion. All light bulbs were changed at this point and 
illumination levels recalibrated. Unfortunately, the lowest 
setting for the stimulus fields gave illumination readings 
slightly higher than those used previously. They were set 
at 5.1 footlamberts while the blank field remained at 11.25 
footlamberts for the duration of the experiment. Additional 
measurements taken near the end of the experiment showed no 
more than an 8 percent variation from these figures, well 
within the standard error of measurement of the instrument 
at these illumination levels. Data obtained before and 
after this change will be compared to determine the effect, 
if any, of these slightly differing illumination levels. 
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fleeting from the tachistoscope housing immediately in front 
of subjects• chair was measured at 11.2 footlamberts. 
Lack of the original stimuli made their exact repli-
cation in terms of brightness, sharpness, and contrast 
impossible. Photocopies of the original stimuli were used 
on three initial pilot subjects with stimulus fields set at 
the illumination levels discussed above. These stimuli met 
the two criteria suggested in the original article (p. 343): 
(a) all pilot subjects reported seeing flickers or flashes 
of light on four successive exposures of each verba~ and 
pictorial stimuli, and (b) the flickers or flashes from 
the two sets of oedipal stimuli could not be distinguished 
from each other by any subject. The original article (p. 
352) also reports ascending threshold data collected for 
two neutral stimuli. For illumination levels approximating 
those here, subjects' mean threshold for first reporting 
anything was 40.2 msec, while mean threshold for correct 
reading was 66.0 msec. In contrast, pilot subjects in the 
present study reported partial cues at aro~~d 15 msec and 
correctly read the stimuli at 20 to 25 msec. In his most 
recent statement, Silverman (personal communication) 
recommends that stimuli be constructed so that partial 
cues are available at about 30 msec and that correct reading 
occur between 40 and 60 msec. As the first stimuli tested 
here clearly did not meet these recommendations and the 
present illumination levels closely approximated those 
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recommended by Silverman, the decision was made to progres-
sively lighten these stimuli so that more comparable 
threshold data could be obtained. 
This was accomplished by photocopying with a piece 
of tracing paper covering the stimulus cards. This process 
was repeated on resultant copies three times, so that three 
gradations of lightness were obtained for each stimulus. 
Six neutral verbal stimuli and one critical stimulus (YOU 
DO OK) were copied in this fashion. Following this, ascend-
ing threshold data for these 21 cards (7 stimuli x 3 light-
ness gradations) were obtained from 7 subjects drawn from 
the population described above. Illumination levels for 
stimulus and blank fields were those to be used in the 
experiment (i.e., 4.5 and 11.25 footlamberts respectively). 
Subjects were instructed to report everything they saw, 
whether a flash, a line, a letter, or a change in bright-
ness, and to report all parts of the stimuli as they were 
seen. For each threshold determination, the subject was 
given forty-five seconds exposure to the blank field (with 
fixation dot), told "Ready," and then exposed to the stim-
ulus for 4 msec. Each stimulus exposure was followed by 
four seconds of the blank field. Stimulus exposure times 
were increased by 2 msec increments until the subject first 
reported a partial cue (e.g., a line, a letter) and then in 
1 msec increments until a correct reading was made. 
Threshold data with stimuli grouped according to lightness 
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gradation are presented in Table 1. Each mean reported is 
based on from twenty-four to thirty-eight threshold deter-
minations. 
Mean threshold scores obtained from the lightest 
group of stimuli (30.4 msec for first report ana 46.1 msec 
for correct reading) most closely approximate the thresholds 
recowmended by Silverman (30 msec and 40 to 60 msec, respec-
tively). On the basis of these results, all remaining 
verbal and pictorial stimulus cards were lightened by the 
process described above so that they approximated this 
group of stimuli in terms of line thickness and contrast. 6 
The stimuli do not appear to differ with regard to angu-
larity. (See Appendix B for photocopies of these stimuli 
that were used in the experiment proper.) 
Procedure for the Replication (Part 1) 
A verbatim account of the experimenter's interaction 
with subjects is provided in Appendix A-II. This was 
adapted with only minor variations from the account ob-
tained from the original authors. The major steps of the 
procedure are described below. 
6These stimuli appeared dramatically lighter than 
the ones originally obtained. Copies of two o£ these 
lightened stimuli and a description of threshold data were 
sent to Dr. Silverman. He replied that the stimuli appeared 
no lighter than others he had used in two-field tachisto-
scope experiments. Further, he reminded the author that no 
illumination measurements had been made in Experiment I of 
the original experiment which used a Scientific Prototype 
three-field tachistoscope comparable to the one used here. 
This could clearly account for the observed differences. 
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Table 1 
Thresholds for Stimuli Grouped by Lightness Gradation 
Light Lighter Lightest 
Range Mean Range Mean Range Mean 
Threshold for 
first report 14-40 24.5 16-38 27.2 20~46 30.4 
Threshold for 
correct reading 18-55 31.8 20-72 39.5 22-94 46.1 
Note. All figures are in msec. 
' . 
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The thirty-eight subjects were randomly divided 
between the two experimenters involved in the study. When 
each subject arrived, he was asked by the experimenter to 
read an information sheet that explains the rudiments of the 
experiment and assures confidentiality (see Appendix A-III). 
He was then asked to sign a consent form (Appendix A-IV). 
If the form was signed, the subject was told of the dart-
throwing competition for which cash prizes o£ $12, $8, and 
$5 would be awarded to the three highest scorers. After a 
brief explanation of the tachistoscope, the subject was 
given the "priming" material identical to that used in the 
original study. This consisted of a brief questionnaire 
(Appendix A-V) involving questions about the subject's rela-
tionships with his mother and father, Rorschach card IV 
(the "father" card), TAT card 7BM (a "father-son'1 scene), 
TAT card 6BM (a "mother-son" scene), and a story recall 
task. The latter involved the subject looking at TAT card 
6BM while being read a story (Appendix A-VI) made up by the 
original authors to contain prominent oedipal elements. 
He then recalled the story and told it back to the experi-
menter. The purpose of these procedures was to 11prime" the 
subjects for the oedipal content to be subliminally pre-
sented. Silverman (1965) reports that for subliminal 
effects to be obtained for normal subjectsr the mental con-
tent that the stimuli were intended to trigqer had to be 
activated by priming beforehand. 
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After eight practice dart throws, each subject was 
put through the two conditions of the replication. Each 
condition consisted of tachistoscopic exposure to a base-
line stimulus pair and a baseline assessment of dart-
throwing (all eight darts were thrown by the subject and 
then retrieved by the experimenter). This was followed by 
the tachistoscopic presentation of one o£ the two experi-
mental oedipal stimuli already described and another eight 
dart throws. This was followed by the other condition, in 
which pretest and posttest assessments of dart-throwing 
were again collected. The sequence of baseline conditions 
remained fixed for all subjects, while the presentations of 
the critical stimuli were randomized. 
Procedure and Materials for 
the Extension (Part 2) 
Immediately upon completion of Part l, the eighteen 
subjects run by the author received the procedure described 
above with exposures to the four non-oedipal stimuli and 
four additional baseline (neutral) stimuli. These new 
stimuli were constructed to resemble (as mDch as possible) 
the original stimuli in clarity, contrast, size, an9ularity, 
and brightness. Each stimulus was 9enerated by tracing 
letters and figures used in the original stimuli. To test 
whether the oedipal elements of the original stimuli were 
necessary, the following stimuli were presented: (a) WIN-
NING DARTS IS OK and a picture of two male figures of the 
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~ age with upturned (smiling) lips looking at each other, 
and (b) WINNING DARTS IS WRONG and a picture of these two 
young men looking with lips turned down (frowning) . Refer-
ence to competition was eliminated in a further set of 
stimuli: (a) YOU DO OK and a picture of one smiling young 
man, and (b) YOU DO WRONG and a picture of the same young 
man frowning. As mentioned earlier, all stimuli were 
lightened so as to most closely match stimuli from which 
recommended threshold data were obtainecl (Appendix C). 
The baseline stimuli for Part 2 were ones used in 
the original experiments. The verbal messages (with con-
gruent pictures) included: (a) PEOPLE ARE THINKING, 
(b) PEOPLE ARE TALKING, (c) PEOPLE ARE LOOJ~ING r and (d) 
PEOPLE ARE WALKING. The baseline stimuli were presented 
in the above sequence for all subjects. As there are 
twenty-four possible sequences in which the four new criti-
cal stimuli could appear, each subject was randomly assigned 
to a different sequence. 
The procedure for insuring that the experimenter 
interacting with the subject was blind to stimulus content 
should be mentioned here. Before each subject appeared, 
the co-experimenter randomly chose one o£ the twenty-four 
possible orders for stimulus presentation. He then placed 
half of the stimuli (using all available stimulus holders) 
face-down on a table (out of subject's sight) in order of 
their presentation. Before each tachistoscopic exposure, 
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the subject was asked to look at the blank field (thus pro-
viding an approximate thirty second adaption period) while 
the experimenter inserted the stimulus cards into the 
fields in such a way as to avoid seeing their front-side. 
Half-way through the procedure, it was necessary for the 
co-experimenter to arrange the remaining cards in their 
order of presentation. Subjects were asked to look at the 
blank field during this time and the experimenter tempo-
rarily left the room. If for any reason, either experi-
menter or subject became aware of stimulus content, data 
for that subject would have been discarded. ~his did not 
occur however. 
Following presentation of the final critical stimuli 
and subsequent dart throws, all subjects completed a dis-
crimination task patterned closely after that described in 
the original study (p. 346). Each subject was given twenty 
trials in which, under the same conditions as existed 
during the experiment proper, he was aske4 to distinguish 
the flickers made by one of the picture-message units from 
those made by another. The two BEATING DAD stimuli were 
presented on one set of ten trials (in random order), while 
a non-oedipal critical stimulus pair was pr€sented with the 
PEOPLE ARE WALKING pair in another ten trials (Appendix 
A-VII). 
Finally, subjects were told that a report of experi-
mental results, prize money, and a description of the sub-
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liminal content would be mailed to them at the end of the 
experiment. They had been requested to leave mailing 
addresses on the questionnaire adrninisterea earlier. If 
at this point, any subject insisted on knowing the content 
of the stimuli, they were revealed and the subject asked 
to keep this information secret. Other questions about the 
experiment were answered and subjects were then encouraged 
to contact the experimenter by phone at any time with any 
further concerns or questions. A summary of these pro-
cedures appears in Table 2. 
Analysis of Data 
Each subject received twelve dart scores (six criti-
cal and six baseline) based on the total of the eight darts 
thrown following each stimulus exposure. The effect of the 
critical stimuli was assessed by subtracti~g each critical 
dart score from the baseline dart score which had immediately 
preceded it. Matched-pairs t tests were computed to deter-
mine the significance of these (baseline minus critical) 
difference scores. All tests of significance were two-
tailed. 
Results for the two BEATING DAD stimuli were ana-
lyzed together and separately for each experimenter0 Addi-
tional t tests were planned to compare the mean difference 
scores obtained by each experimenter for each critical 
stimulus. Thus, the presence of any differential experi-
menter effect could be assessed. The effect of the small 
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Table 2 
Summary of Procedure 
Part 1 (38 subjects divided between co-experimenters) 
1. Introduction and signing consent form 
2. Priming procedures 
3. Eight practice dart throws 
4. Baseline 1 stimulation (PEOPLE ARE SITTING) 
5. Baseline 1 dart throws (eight throws for each condition) 
6. Critical 1 stimulation (one of the BEATING DAD stimuli) 
7. Critical 1 dart throws 
8. Baseline 2 stimulation (PEOPLE AP~ STANDING) 
9. Baseline 2 dart throws 
10. Critical 2 stimulation (the other BEATING DAD pair) 
11. Critical 2 dart throws 
Part 2 (18 subjects run by the author} 
12. Baseline 3 stimulation (PEOPLE ARE TBINKING) 
13. Baseline 3 dart throws 
14. Critical 3 stimulation (one of the four non-oedipal 
critical stimulus pairs) 
15. Critical 3 dart throws 
(At this point, the co-experimenter arranged the remaining 
·stimulus cards.) 
16. Baseline 4 stimulation (PEOPLE ARE TAL~ING} 
17. Baseline 4 dart throws 
18. Critical 4 stimulation (another non-oedipal stimulus 
pair) 
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Table 2--Continued 
19. Critical 4 dart throws 
20. Baseline 5 stimulation (PEOPLE ARE LOOKING) 
21. Baseline 5 dart throws 
22. Critical 5 stimulation (non-oedipal stimulus) 
23. Critical 5 dart throws 
24. Baseline 6 stimulation (PEOPLE ARE WALXING) 
25. Baseline 6 dart throws 
26. Critical 6 stimulation (non-oedipal stimulus) 
27. Critical 6 dart throws 
28. Discrimination task 
29. Debriefing 
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change in tachistoscopic lighting was also tested by com-
paring mean difference scores for each critical stimulus 
obtained before and after this change. 
Finally, Silverman (personal communication) has 
suggested that the experimental effect obtained in the 
original study may be of a rather short duration. To 
investigate this possibility, matched-pairs ~tests were 
planned for the BEATING DAD stimuli using only the first 
four dart throws that followed each baseline and critical 
stimulus exposure. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Results of the Replication 
Means and standard deviations for dart scores 
obtained following the two BEATING DAD stimuli and their 
associated baseline stimuli are presented in Table 3. 
Results are presented separately for each experimenter and 
as combined for all thirty-eight subjects, The results of 
the matched-pairs t tests computed for these data are pre-
sented in Table 4. These reveal that the only statistically 
significant result obtained was for the author's subjects 
following exposure to the BEATING DAD IS WRONG stimulus 
(E < .01~ 2-tailed). Dart scores increased significantly 
here, a finding directly opposite that of the original 
study. Fourteen subjects showed increases in dart scores 
following this stimulus while only four showed decreases, 
X 2 (1) =.4.55, E < .05. The co-experimenter obtained no 
effect with the same stimulus. When resuifs from both 
experimenters are combined, neither of the oedipally-
related stimuli had a significant effect an dart scores. 
These results clearly fail to support Silverman's findings 
on the effects of subliminal stimulation with these stimuli 
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Table 3 
Mean Critical and Baseline Dart Scores 
For the Replication 
Swanson Casas Combined 
Stimulus (n=l8) (!:?_=20) (~_==38) 
BEATING DAD IS OK 
Baseline 
Mean 445.56 461.00 453.68 
so 89.19 88.6J 88.05 
Critical 
Mean 437.22 468.50 453.68 
so 102.83 108.35 105.53 
BEATING DAD IS WRONG 
Baseline 
Mean 419.44 458.00 439.74 
so 120.71 128.42 124.67 
Critical 
Mean 465.00 451.0() 457.63 
so 92.94 130. 34: 112.88 
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Table 4 
Matched-Pairs t Test Results for the Replication 
Swanson Casas Combined 
Stimulus (n=l8) (~=:20} (n=38) 
BEATING DAD IS OK 
Mean difference 8.33 7.50 0.00 
SD of difference 102.97 64.72 84.18 
t 0.343 0.51B 0.000 
BEATING DAD IS WRONG 
Mean difference - 45.55 7.00 - 17.89 
SD of difference· 65.64 80.20 77.40 
t 2.944* 0.390 1.425 
*E < • 01, 2-tailed • 
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and, in one instance, are in the opposite direction of his 
original findings. 
Differences in results obtained by the two experi-
menters were assessed by £ tests. There was no difference 
for the BEATING DAD IS OK stimulus, t(36) = 0.558, ns. In 
contrast, the experimenters obtained significantly different 
results with the BEATING DAD IS WRONG stimulus, t(36) = 
2.137, E < .OS, 2-tailed. This result suggests an experi-
menter or experimenter x subject interaction effect and 
raises serious questions as to the generalizability of the 
phenomenon. 
As noted earlier, Silverman has raised the possi-
bility that the experimental effect may be of a rather 
short duration following subliminal stimulation. That is, 
the effect may be evident for only the initial dart throws 
following each stimulus exposure. Table 5 presents mean 
differences '(between critical and associated baseline 
scores) and matched-pairs t tests computed using only the 
first four dart throws in each condition. These results 
are essentially the same as those obtained when all eight 
dart throw scores are used. No stimulus had a significant 
effect on dart scores, though BEATING DAD IS WRONG 
ap~roached significance (E < .10, 2 -tailed) for the author's 
subjects. For this stimulus, the average increase of 29.44 
points for four dart throws compared to the average increase 
of 45.55 for all eight darts suggests that the obtained 
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Table 5 
Matched-Pairs .L. Test Results Using Only First 1... 
Four Dart Throws Following Each Stimulus Exposure 
Swanson Casas Combined 
Stimulus (n=l8) (!2_=20) (~=38) 
BEATING DAD IS OK 
Mean difference 10.56 - 15.00 2.89 
SD of difference 63.66 55.8J 60.27 
t 0.684 1.201 0.296 
BEATING DAD IS WRONG 
Mean difference - 29.44 0.50 - 14.21 
SD of difference 57.55 69.92 65.17 
t 1.741* 0. 032 1.344 
*E < .10, 2-tailed. 
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effect was fairly evenly distributed over the first four 
and second four dart throws. These results do not support 
the hypothesis of a short-lived subliminal effect. 
Finally, the effect of the small increase in 
stimulus field illumination was examined. Average differ-
ences (between critical and associated baseline scores) 
obtained before and after the lighting change were com-
pared using t tests. None of these four (two experimenters 
x two stimuli) tests approached significance. 
Results of the Extension and 
Discrimination Task 
The two WINNING DARTS and two YOU DO stimuli and 
associated baseline stimuli were subliminally presented as 
a test of whether the specifically oedipal content of the 
original stimuli were necessary to obtain an effect on dart 
scores. Summary statistics for the eighteen subjects ex-
posed to these stimuli are presented in Table 6. Exarnina-
tion of Table 7 reveals that none of these £our critical 
stimuli had a significant effect on dart scores, although 
the \HNNING DARTS IS OK stimulus approached significance 
(p < .10, 2-tailed). Again, the direction of this near-
significant effect was surprising in that this stimulus 
tended to lead to decreases in dart scores. Similarly, the 
WINNING DARTS IS WRONG stimulus tended to produce increases 
in dart-throwing accuracy (£ < .20, 2-tailed). 
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Table 6 
Mean Critical and Baseline Dart Scores 
for the Extension 
Stimulus 
WINNING DARTS IS OK 
Baseline 
Critical 
WINNING DARTS IS WRONG 
Baseline 
Critical 
YOU DO OK 
Baseline 
Critical 
YOU DO WRONG 
Baseline 
Critical 
Note. N = 18. 
Mean 
466.11 
435.56 
456.11 
487.78 
4 3 3. 89 
436.67 
451.11 
463.33 
SD 
61.56 
95.38 
98.77 
90.00 
74.61 
71.21 
111.56 
86.57 
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Table 7 
Matched-Pairs t Test Results for the Extension 
Stimulus 
WINNING DARTS IS OK 
WINNING DARTS IS WRONG 
YOU DO OK 
YOU DO WRONG 
Note. N = 18. 
Mean 
Difference 
30.55 
-31.67 
- 2.78 
-12.22 
*p < .10, 2-tailed. 
SD of 
Difference t 
70.50 1. 839 * 
92.12 -1.459 
85.74 -0.138 
114.05 -0.455 
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1 b . 7 Seventeen of these eig teen su Jects were given a 
discrimination task to test for the availability of partial 
cues. Of the 20 discriminations required, one subjectwas 
correct 13 times, one subject 12 times, two subjects 11 
times, five subjects 10 times, three subjects 9 times, one 
subject 8 times, one subject 7 times} one subject 4 times, 
and two subjects 3 times. With a minimum of 14 correct or 
incorrect discriminations comprising a nonchance perform-
ance (E = .10, 2-tailed), three subjects met this criterion. 
These three made significantly more incorrect discrimina-
tions than expected however. For the group as a whole, the 
mean nlli~er of correct discriminations was 8.76 which did 
not significantly differ from the expected 10 correct of 20 
discriminations. As the stimuli were presented under the 
same conditions as existed during the experiment proper, 
these results provide no support for the presence of par-
tial cues. 
7
one subject complained of eye strain and was 
excused from this task. 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
The major conclusion to be drawn from the present 
study is that it failed to replicate any part o£ Silverman, 
Ross, Adler, and Lustig's (1978) demonstration of "subliminal 
psychodynamic activation" with the dart-throwing paradigm. 
This was true for both oedipally-related stimuli and for two 
experimenters running separate groups of subjects. To 
appreciate the difference in results of the two studies, it 
should be noted that the original authors (p. 354) report 
that 86 percent (67 of 78) of their subjects produced 
results in the hypothesized direction. -In contrast, the 
present study found only 42 percent (16 of 38) o£ the sub-
jects prodt1ced hypothesized results, while 55 percent (21 
of 38) had results in the opposite direction. 8 Furthermore, 
the only significant result obtained here was limited to 
one experimenter and was a reversal o£ the results o£ the 
original study. 
Before discussion of this result and those £or the 
8These percentages were derived by comparing the 
relative magnitude of difference scores (baseline minus 
critical) for the two BEATING DAD stimuli obtained by each 
subject. One subject obtained equal difference scores so 
percentages do not total one hundred. 
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non-oedipal critical stimuli, possible explanations for 
this failure to replicate are considered. These include 
differences in procedure and materials, subject groups, or 
experimenters. Procedurally, every attempt was made here 
to replicate the original study as exactly as possible. In 
both studies for example, the experiment was called "Tour-
nament" on subject sign-up forms. The same kind of tachis-
toscope and dart board were used. Durations and frequencies 
of stimulus exposures were those reported by Silverman. 
Room and stimulus field illuminations were within the range 
of those reported for the original experiments. 9 Further, 
stimulus materials were generated from copies of the orig-
inal stimuli with the help of frequent consultation with 
Dr. Silverman. Ascending threshold data collected for the 
stimuli used here met the specifications of the original 
author. Finally, data collected from the discrimination 
tasks were quite similar and support the absence of partial 
cue availability in both studies. Though slight or non-
obvious differences in equipment and stimuli were none-
theless present despite these precautions~ it is unclear 
how they might account for the radically Bifferent results 
obtained in the two studies. 
9The present experimenters may in fact have been more 
meticulous than the original authors in specifying the 
methods for obtaining illumination measurements and in 
taking repeated measurements throughout the course of the 
experiment (see METHODS). The original stuay does notre-
port measurement methods, gives only one illumination 
reading for each experiment, ana fails to report any per-
tinent data for one experiment. 
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The introduction and priming stages of the experi-
ments were almost identical for the two studies. One 
noticeable difference however was the mention here of the 
"co-worker [who] will come in and change the cards 
(Appendix A-II)." In the original study, stimulus cards 
were previously coded and then arranged £or each subject 
by the experimenter according to a list. In an effort to 
better ensure that the experimenter remained blind to 
stimulus content, a second experimenter was introduced to 
arrange the cards in the present study. Of course, this 
second person did not enter the room until after the repli-
cation part of the experiment was completed, so that any 
differential effect must have been due solely to the men-
tion of this procedure in the experimenter's introductory 
remarks (see Table 2). 
Differences in subject groups are always possible 
and could account for the differing results. Available 
demographic data show that subjects' ages were almost 
identical (mean age of 19.0 here and 19.3, 19.6 1 and 19.5 
for the original experiments). In both studies, all sub-
jects were college males and most were from introductory 
psychology classes. Subjects whose native language was 
not English were excluded. As Loyola University enrolls 
a large proportion of Catholic students, differences in 
subjects' involvement in religion must be considered. For 
example, religious involvement or history may in part 
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determine personal meanings given to the words "ok" and 
"wrong." One can further speculate that the word "dad" 
may evoke special meaning for Catholic males if it is 
associated with the more religious "father." Along these 
lines, Silverman (personal communication) has noted that 
there may be regional differences in how subjects under-
stand the word "beating." The word may connote physical 
attack, defeating in competition, fatigue or exhaustion, 
cheating or circumventing, or possibly the lifestyle of 
Jack Kerouac. Words such as "defeating," "winning over," 
or "whupping" may more clearly communicate the intended 
meaning for different subjects. Unfortunately, no data 
are available for either group of subjects that could shed 
light on the possible relevance of subjects' religious 
involvement or idiosyncratic and associative meanings 
given to stimulus words. 10 The contributions of these 
variables remains a question open to further research. 
Finally, differences in the experimenters need be 
considered. Three male experimenters ranging from twenty 
years to early thirties in age obtained the predicted 
results in the original study. In the present study, two 
male experimenters, ages twenty-four and twenty-six, failed 
10Along with the letter to subjects discussing 
results and stimulus content, the author plans to send a 
questionnaire inquiring as to the kind and extent of 
religious involvement of subjects both at present and as 
children, the term used to refer to their fathers, and the 
meaning they give to the word "beating. •• 
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to obtain the predicted results. Though differences in 
appearance, manner, or personality may have differentiated 
the two groups of experimenters, it is difficult to under-
stand how they could have systematically affected subjects' 
responses to stimuli of which the experimenters were un-
aware. Clearly, one can only speculate as to how experi-
menter characteristics interacted with subliminally pre-
sented stimuli to change the unconscious meaning of the 
situation for subjects. 
Differences in methods, materials, subjects, and 
experimenters between studies can never be completely 
eliminated. Given the present experimenters' careful 
attempts at replication however, there are clearly no 
obvious or straightforward reasons explaining the radi-
cally different results obtained. Thus, the present 
results suggest, at minimum, that the predicted effect is 
not "reliable and powerful" as described by the original 
authors (p. 354). Rather, it is more probable that the 
original effect was dependent on highly specific and 
unknown situational, subject, or experimenter variables. 
In this case, the original effect may be more accurately 
characterized as fragile and lacking generalizability. 
In the second part of the present stucly, four addi-
tional stimuli were presented to eighteen subjects in an 
attempt to determine which elements of the oedipally-
related stimuli were necessary to affect dart scores. None 
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of these stimuli produced a significant effect 1 although 
WINNING DARTS IS OK approached significance. Here, the 
direction of effect was opposite expectation as this stim-
ulus produced average decreases of thirty points in dart 
scores. Similarly, the stimulus WINNING DARTS IS WRONG 
was followed by increases of over thirty points. Along 
with the significant reversal of original effect obtained 
in the replication attempt, these results (though only sug-
gestive) p9int to the hazards of predicting the kinds of 
effects produced by subliminal stimulation. The observed 
relationships between stimulus content and effect could not 
have easily been predicted by psychoanalytic theory or more 
common sense notions. Pine's (1964) notion of "indirect" 
effects which are not logically or obviously related to 
stimulus content appears pertinent here. In addition, the 
fact that these results did not reach significance further 
highlights the fragile nature of subliminal effects in the 
dart-throwing paradigm. 
Perhaps the most provocative result of the present 
study is the finding that for the author's subjects, 
BEATING DAD IS WRONG led to increases in dart scores 
(£ < .01, 2-tailed). This is a reversal of findings in 
the original study. Additionally, this stimulus produced 
no significant dart-score changes for the co-experimenter's 
b . 11 su Jects. Given that both experimenters followed iden-
11As noted earlier, the experimenters obtained sig-
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tical procedures, were blind to stimulus content and that 
subjects were randomly divided between them, this result 
is not easily explained. Evidence bearing on the possi-
bility of an experimenter effect, subject group differences, 
and random error are considered next. 
The two groups of subjects here had almost identical 
ages (means of 18.9 and 19.0 years) and were largely college 
freshmen and sophomores. In an effort to identify any pos-
sibly relevant subject variables, data from the question-
naire, Rorschach, TAT, and story recall task collected as 
part of "priming," were informally analyzed at the conclu-
sian of the experiment. These data suggested large varia-
tions between subjects on dimensions loosely labeled "defen-
siveness," "amount of oedipal content," "performance 
anxiety," and "guilt manifestations." A sorting of proto-
cols on the basis of these variables failed to reliably 
differentiat~ between subjects run by either experimenter, 
or subjects who attained the predicted results from those 
who obtained reversals. Thus, this informal, post hoc 
analysis revealed no systematic differences between the 
subject groups. As noted earlier, variability in subjects' 
religious involvement or in idiosyncratic meanings asso-
ciated with the stimulus words may have mediated the dif-
nificantly different results with this stimulus, !(36) = 
2.137, E < .05, 2-tailed. 
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12 fering results for the two groups. No data are available 
which could aid in determining whether the subject groups 
differed in other variables possibly related to subliminal 
stimulation effects, e.g., hemisphericity (Sackeim, Packer, 
& Gur, 1977), visual information processing speeds 
(Browning-Crinion, Dolmetsch, & Mayzner, 1978), state of 
arousal (Dixon, 1971), and level and type of drive-activa-
tion (Klein & Holt, 1960). 
Any of these (or other unknown) subject variables 
could have acted directly or interacted with some differ-
ence between the two experimenters to produce the obtained 
results. In an attempt to assess this last possibility, the 
two experimenters ran each other through the replication 
procedures following the conclusion of the experiment. 
Though minor differences in manner, inflection, and pace were 
observed, it was difficult to imagine that these were 
responsible for the experimental results. It can also be 
noted that the experimenters are about the same age, dress 
in much the same style, and bear few striking dissimilari-
ties in physical appearance. As none of these readily 
observable variables appears to clearly differentiate the 
two experimenters, one may speculate that the two may have 
been perceived differently on an unconscious level due to 
12
nata obtained from the subject questionnaire dis-
cussed earlier will be analyzed for subject group differences. 
Any variable that appears to do so can be used as a pre-
dictor of subliminal effect in future research. 
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subtleties of communication and personality. For example, 
it may have occurred that subjects perceived the author and 
thus the experimental situation in such a way that the 
BEATING DAD IS WRONG stimulus was unconsciously experienced 
as a punishment which expiated guilt. This relief of guilt 
may have operated as a release leading to improved com-
petitive performance. 13 This explanation is clearly only 
one of many possible speculations and is quite loosely 
based on psychoanalytic notions of oedipal guilt and expia-
tion. Further, the mechanisms mediating such a phenomenon 
are generally unknown making any test of the hypothesis 
difficult to envision. 
The preceding discussion makes evident the diffi-
culty of explaining why the effect of the BEATING DAD IS 
WRONG stimulus attained significance for one experimenter 
and not for the other, and why its direction was opposite 
that found by three previous experimenters. None of the 
l)I t t. 1 th . . d . , n eres 1ng y, ere 1s some ev1 ence suggest1ng 
a general tendency for the author's subjects to improve 
dart scores following exposure to any of the three stimuli 
containing the word "wrong." Ignoring baseline scores for 
the moment, examination of Tables 3 and 6 reveals that mean 
dart scores following WRONG stimulation are greater than 
scores following their respective OK stimuli (by 27.78 
points for the BEATING DAD pair, 52.22 for WINNING DARTS, 
and 26.66 for YOU DO). Another way to demonstrate this 
tendency is to compare overall mean difference scores 
(baseline minus critical} for the three OK stimuli to those 
obtained for the WRONG stimuli (Tables 4 and 7). Again, 
WRONG stimuli led to significant increases relative to 
changes following OK stimuli, t(52) = 2.462, p < .02, 2-
tailed. The significance of this finding is unclear. 
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possibilities mentioned are compelling for their evidence, 
logic, or parsimony. Perhaps a more credible explanation 
is that the result is due to random error, despite having 
attained statistical significance. That is, it may repre-
sent a Type I error in which the null hypothesis is falsely 
rejected. In any experiment, the liklihood of a Type I 
error increases as many statistical tests (t tests here) 
are applied to the data. This explanation has the value 
of additional parsimony as the results of the two experi-
menters here could then be considered consistent and the 
problem posed by the reversal of effect would be eliminated. 
Clearly, this possibility can be tested by a future repli-
cation of the significant parts of the present study. 
Whether or not the significant result is a repli-
cable phenomenon, the present study creates doubt regarding 
the generalizability of the original findings and the 
theoretical rationale advanced to explain them. Given the 
care taken to replicate the original study as exactly as 
possible, these results suggest that the findings of Silver-
man, Ross, Adler, and Lustig (1978) may have been dependent 
on highly specific and unknown situational, subject, or 
experimenter variables. The reversal of effect for one 
stimulus and the results for the non-oedipal stimuli raise 
questions as to Silverman's (1976) assertion that subliminal 
stimulation can directly activate unconscious wishes or 
conflicts leading to predictable behavioral consequences. 
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As noted earlier, the only published independent replica-
tion attempts of Silverman's work (Greenberg, 1977i Emmel-
kamp & Straatman, 1976) also obtained negative results. 
Though these two studies contained many of the same methodo-
logical flaws as the original experiments, the continued 
inability of independent investigators to successfully 
replicate raises serious questions as to the strength of 
the results of Silverman's overall research program. Con-
trary to the assertions of Silverman, Ross, Adler, and 
Lustig (1978, p. 354), subliminal effects do not appear to 
be strong and reliable even when experimental stimuli, 
subjects' motivational state, and type of response measure 
are (apparently) congruent. As in the 1950s and 1960s, 
subliminal perception appears to be an ambiguous phenomena 
that is not easily demonstrable (Eriksen, 1960i Wolitzky & 
Wachtel, 1973). 
In conclusion, possible reasons for the inability 
of researchers to consistently demonstrate subliminal 
effects are briefly considered. Within the psychoanalytic 
framework, many studies have been designed from somewhat 
simplistic theoretical notions. Silverman's work (1976), 
for example, appears based on the assumption that a com-
plex verbally coded message can bypass usual defensive oper-
ations to directly affect significant unconscious fantasies 
or conflicts. This assumption appears to ignore the com-
plex nature and purposes attributed to defense mechanisms 
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by psychoanalytic theorists (e.g., A. Freud, 1936/1966). 
It is also difficult to envision how stimulus content 
could have such a direct and specific effect on unconscious 
processes. The mechanisms underlying translation of a 
verbal or simple pictorial message into something impacting 
on primary-process or unconscious events are given scant 
attention by Silverman and other researchers. This casts 
doubt on the validity of the "subliminal psychodynamic 
activation" paradigm as a method for testing psychoanalytic 
hypotheses. 
Finally, subjects differ on variables which may 
mediate subliminal effects. For example, rates of processing 
briefly presented verbal information show large individual 
differences (Browning-Crinion, Dolmetsch, & Mayzner, 1978). 
Similarly, one might expect large individual differences 
in the amounts and ways that information is processed when 
presented sublimina·lly. This would make difficult the task 
of establishing stimulus parameters for which all (or most) 
subjects could show subliminal effects. Individual dif-
ferences might also be expected in subjects' defensive 
organization and the meanings given to stimulus materials. 
Thus, stimulus content that has a significant emotional or 
unconscious wish-related impact for one subject may be 
affectively neutral for another. Related to this is the 
psychoanalytic notion that individuals differ widely in the 
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ways that unconscious wishes or conflicts are consciously 
experienced and behaviorally expressed (Fenichel, 1945). 
This may help to explain why subliminal effects are dif-
ficult to predict for a group of subjects. In light of 
these considerations, a more open-ended, exploratory 
approach to research on subliminal perception is recom-
mended for the present. 
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I. Room Diagram 
84" 
E stood here 
during dart throws 
S's 
chair 
Table with 
tachistoscope 
118" 
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II. Details of Experimenter-Subject Interactions 
Before S arrives: Turn on tach. Adjust times and illumina-
tion levels. Arrange materials. 
When S arrives: "I'm and as you may know this is a 
study of factors that influence competitive performance. 
We can begin by your reading this information sheet." 
[Show S information sheet, have him sign consent form, then 
say] "In addition to what was described on there, I want to 
add that the tournament part of the experiment will involve 
your throvling darts at. the dart board up there. Before we 
get to that, however, let me explain about this equipment 
here." 
Reassurance about tach: "The equipment here is called a 
tachistoscope, and will be used in the experiment. It. can 
regulate p~ecisely the amount of time a picture or message 
can be flashed and seen. In this experiment we will be 
flashing messages or pictures at a speed of four one-
thousands of a second, a speed at which you would probably 
be aware only of a brief flash or flicker of light. The 
messages or pictures should register in your mind however, 
and after the experiment you will have an opportunity to 
find out about the content of the stimuli you were shovm. 
Do you wear corrective lens for any reason?" [If so, be 
sure Swears them during tach exposures.] 
Questionnaire: "Now I would like you to fill out this ques-
tionnaire." [Be sure S includes his mailing address.] 
Rorschach Card 4: "Now I am going to show you an ink blot, 
and I want you to tell me what you imagine you see. There 
are no right or wrong answers. Different people imagine 
different kinds of things. If you should see more than one 
thing in the card, then tell me everything it looks like to 
you." [Do inquiry as to location only and allow no more 
than 8 responses.] 
TAT Card 7 BM: "Now I am going to show you a picture, and 
I would like you to make up a story about the picture, having 
a past, present, and a future or outcome." [Inquire into 
outcome if not spontaneously given. Inquire if an emotional 
description is used that is unclear.] 
TAT Card 6 BM: "Now I am going to show you another picture, 
and I would like you to make up a story about the picture, 
having a past, present, and a future or outcome." 
TAT Story (to Card 6 BM) and Recall: "Now I am going to 
read you a story we made up for the purpose of this experi-
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ment about this picture, and I will ask you to recall it 
back to me after I finish reading it." [Read story.] 
"I would like you to recall the story as best you can, and 
tell it back to me." 
Explanation of Tournament: "Okay, now we come to the 
tournament. As you can see, the top places so far are 
listed over here. The top three places in the tournament 
will receive cash prizes of $12, $8 and $5. I am going to 
have you throw a total of 96 darts. You will throw 12 
series of 8 darts, and before each series you will sit down 
and look into the tach. Your grand score will count in the 
tournament. Before I give you the instructions about that, 
why don't you step over there and throw eight practice 
darts? Stand behind that line and throw all eight darts. 
Make sure you throw them hard enough so they stick. If a 
dart doesn't stick in, or if it falls out, your score for 
that throw will be zero. However, if a dart falls out of 
the bullseye, it will count as 100 points." [S throws 
eight darts. After each series of eight darts, return 
darts to table next to S.) 
Tournament Procedure: "Now I want you to sit in that chair 
and look into the tach. I will be at the contols over here, 
and I will say 'Ready, set' and then press a button whLch 
will produce two flickers of light three seconds apart. 
After seeing several flashes you will get up, walk to the 
line, and throw a series of eight darts. Then you will sit 
down and look into the tach again. In a while, my co-
worker will come in and change the cards being put into the 
tach. That way, neither of us will know exactly what is 
being shown. If you have any questions, hold them until 
the end of the experiment, and we can discuss ·them then. 
Now, look into the tach. Do you see a red dot? Okay, try 
to focus on that. During the time we are doing this part 
of the experiment, try not to blink, and don't look up 
from the machine. I will show you a set of flashes, wait 
a few seconds, then show you another set. You will see 
four sets of flickers in all. Okay. Ready, set • • • " 
[After first few sets of flashes, ask] "Did you see any 
flickers? Tell me what you saw." [Then instructS to 
just tell you if they don't see any flickers.] 
Discrimination Task: [See instruction sheet.] 
Debriefing: "We are finished now. As I told you at the 
beginnlng, our interest in this experiment was to see 
whether your dart throwing could be effected by the sub-
liminal messages you were receiving. What we plan to do 
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at the end of this experiment is to send a letter to all of 
our subjects and tell you what the results of the study were. 
We will also tell you the exact messages that you sub-
liminally receivad. We would prefer to wait until every-
body has been run through the study before revealing to 
anyone what the subliminal stimuli are. Is that alright 
with you?" [If s insists on knowing at this time what the 
stimuli are, reveal them to him and ask him to keep this 
information secret.] "If you think of any other questions 
or have any other concerns related to this study, feel free 
to contact me at any time at the number listed on the 
scheduling card." 
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III. Information about "The Effect on 
Competitive Performance Through 
Subliminal Presentation of Con-
flictual and Non-Conflictual 
Stimuli" 
There are many things which affect a person's com-
petitive performance. One important group of factors, we 
believe, is the way in which people see, and/or remember 
faint or indistinct experiences. By experimentally studying 
this group of factors in people involved in competitive 
situations we hope to better understand how performance may 
be hindered or improved. 
If you decide to participate in this study you will 
be asked to throw darts at a dartboard, answer some ques-
tions, make up short stories, and look at quickly flashed 
lights which will be words or pictures. From past expe-
rience with these or similar procedures we expect no ill 
effect to you. Also, we expect to learn a great deal about 
how competitive performance is affected, which, hopefully, 
will be useful one day in helping people in various realms 
of endeavor. 
You do not have to participate in this study, and 
if you do agree to participate you can still change your 
mind at any time and withdraw from this study. Your deci-
sion will in no way be held against you. This is simply a 
research study. All information will remain strictly con-
fidential. 
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IV. Standard Consent Form 
Please Read carefully Before Signing 
I have agreed to participate in the experiment 
"Tournament" and hereby give my consent to be a subject. 
The experimenter has explained the procedures of the 
experiment to me and has described discomforts or incon-
veniences I may be subjected to, if any. I understand 
that my responses will be kept in the strictest of con-
fidence and anonymity. I have the option to withdraw 
from this experiment at any time and I also have the 
right to request that my responses not be used. 
Exper1menter's Signature 
SUBJECT'S SIGNATURES 
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V. Priming Questionnaire 
Name Age 
----
Address ____________________________________________________ __ 
Level of Education G p A Married? Parent 
--- . . . --- --- ----
Father's Occupation Your Occupational Goal 
------- -----
By circling the appropriate letter please indicate 
to what extent you agree or disagree with the statements below. 
A. I am a competitive person. 
a b c d 
a) strongly agree 
b) agree 
c) disagree 
d) strongly disagree 
B. I would rather be "alone, at the top" than part of the 
masses. 
a b c d 
C. I have a relatively conflict-free relationship with my 
mother. 
a b c d 
D. I am close with my mother. 
a b c d 
E. I have a relatively conflict-free relationship with my 
father. 
a b c d 
F. I am close with my father. 
a b c d 
G. It is difficult for me to be assertive with other people. 
a b c d 
H. I am prone to feel guilty about things more than most 
people. 
a b c d 
I. Most people would consider my father a success. 
a b c d 
J. I consider my father a success. 
a b c d 
VI. Story for Story Recall 
(to Card 6 BM) 
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(LetS look at card while listening to the story.) 
This is a mother and her son standing there in a 
state of stunned silence. Just moments before, the father 
was also there, but he has stormed out of the room feeling 
extremely angry towards his son. They had had a loud argu-
ment in which the son told his father that he was no longer 
competent to run the family business, that he should retire, 
and that he (the son) should take over. Since the mother 
plays an important role in the running of the business, 
this would give the son an opportunity to fulfill a long-
harbored secret wish of his: to spend more time with her 
and enjoy more often the closeness they've shared in the 
past. In his anger at being criticized by his son, the 
father ostracized the son and threatened to exclude him 
altogether from the family business. As he stormed out 
of the room he cautioned: "Just remember who's still the 
father around here." The son is now feeling guilty and 
fears that he may have overstepped his bounds. He is also 
afraid that he has threatened the closeness which he and 
his father often experienced together. The mother is torn 
between her love for her husband and her love for her son. 
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VII. Discrimination Task 
"Okay, there's just one more thing we're going to do. I have 
two sets of cards here and I want to see whether you can tell 
them apart when I flash them on at the same speed I did 
during the experiment. Try as hard as you can because the 
person who does the best on this will win a $5 cash prize. 
I am going to show you four pairs of exposures of one set 
of slides, which will be followed by four pairs of expo-
sures of either the same set or a different set. After the 
second set of four exposures and after each set after that 
I want you to tell me whether you think the set you just 
saw was the same or different than the set right before it. 
You will be comparing each set of exposures to the set you 
saw right before it. Okay, now if you would put your eyes 
up against the viewer, we can get started. During this 
task, please don't look up; keep your eyes focused into the 
machine. Here's four exposures of the first set (exposures}. 
Now I'm going to show you four more exposures of either the 
same or a different set. Just say 'same' or 'different' to 
indicate what you think (exposures). Now for another four 
exposures and tell me if they are the same as or different 
than the one you just saw (exposures)." Continue, following 
the order of trials in column I below. 
"Now we're going to do the same thing with another two sets 
of cards. Here are four exposures of the first set {expo-
sures). Now here are four exposures of another set and 
like before you say 'same' or 'different' {exposures)." 
Follow the order of trials in column II below. 
Give the ten trials in column I utilizing the BEATING DAD IS 
OK and BEATING DAD IS WRONG stimuli pairs. Then give the 
ten trials in column II utilizing the PEOPLE ARE WALKING and 
one of the additional critical stimuli pairs (e.g., YOU DO 
OK stimuli pair). Be sure to show both the verbal and 
the pictorial stimuli for each set of exposures. 
N.B. When you put in the same stimulus be sure to pull it 
out of the chamber and put it in again so that S is not 
cued by the sound of what you are doing as to whether the 
next exposures will be "same" or "different." Also, attempt 
to shield the pictorial stimuli from S's view when putting 
it into the b"3. ch. 
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